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Abstract
Focal points (Schelling, 1960) have shown limitations as coordination devices in
games with conflict, such as the battle of the sexes games. We experimentally test
whether an increase in their salience can counteract the negative impact of conflict
on coordination. The intuition is that, in the presence of conflict, the solution to the
coordination dilemma offered by the focal point loses importance. Increasing its salience
increases its relevance and therefore coordination success. Our results provide strong
support for this conjecture. Furthermore, when games feature outcomes with different
degrees of payoffs’ inequality (i.e. the difference of players’ payoffs) and efficiency (i.e.
the sum of players’ payoffs), increasing salience does not lead to an obvious increase in
coordination, unless the salience of the focal point is maximal.
Keywords: coordination games, focal points, salience, conflict of interests, battle-of-the-
sexes, intermixed-blocked effect.
JEL Codes: C72, C78, C91, D91
∗We thank Ben Mcquillin, Alessandro Sontuoso, Robert Sugden and participants in the seminar series at
University of East Anglia, Chapman University, and in the Eastern Arc workshop held at the University of
Kent. Jiwei Zheng’s work on the project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC)
under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, grant agreement No. 670103.
†The George L. Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman Univeristy. Email: ro-
joarjo@chapman.edu
‡Corresponding author. School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science,
University of East Anglia, Norwich (UK). Email: s.sitzia@uea.ac.uk
§Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster (UK). Email:
j.zheng18@lancaster.ac.uk
1 Introduction
If husband and wife lose each other in a department store without a prior agreement on where
to meet, they are likely to look for an “obvious” place. A place (e.g., the lost-and-found stand)
that they both “must ‘mutually recognize’ [as] some unique signal that coordinates their
expectations” (Schelling, 1960, p. 54). Using anecdotes such as this, as well as “unscientific
experiments”, Schelling shows that payoff-irrelevant features of a strategic situation often
offer a solution, a focal point, that allows individuals to coordinate more successfully than
what conventional game theory predicts, provided these features are visible to all players
and common knowledge.
According to Schelling, players use these payoff-irrelevant features to label strategies and
identify a solution even in games in which interests are not completely aligned - e.g., battle
of the sexes games. (Imagine for example that wife prefers to meet in the travel agency
section and the husband in the sport section, and both are aware of this). Coordinating on
this solution however, requires “discipline” as:
“The need for agreement overrules the potential disagreement, and each must concert with the
other or lose altogether” (Schelling, 1960, p. 60).
And players simply have to accept what nature has chosen as the signal for coordination:
“Beggars cannot be choosers about the source of their signal or about its attractiveness compared
with others that they can only wish were as conspicuous. [. . . ] The conflict gets reconciled - or
perhaps we should say ignored - as a by-product of the dominant need for coordination.” (Schelling,
1960, pp. 66, 59).
Experimental evidence supports Schelling’s theory of focal points mostly in games without
conflict of interests. In these games, often referred to as pure coordination games, payoffs
for both players and across equilibria are the same (e.g. Mehta et al., 1994; Crawford et al.,
2008; Isoni et al., 2013). By contrast, in games with conflict of interests the effectiveness of
focal points is greatly reduced (e.g. Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2013; Parravano and
Poulsen, 2015). Although the coordination failure observed in these games has been shown
to be compatible with level-k thinking (Crawford et al., 2008; Faillo et al., 2017; van Elten
and Penczynski, 2020), alternative hypotheses have been investigated. These hypotheses
mostly concern, directly or indirectly, payoff-related mechanisms.
For example, Isoni et al. (2013), investigate whether the negative effect of conflict on
coordination, documented on matching games (i.e. games in which players are required to
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choose the same object) such as the battle of the sexes, carries over to bargaining games
in which players make claims on a surplus, represented by valuable discs. Coordination
occurs if no disc is claimed by both bargainers. They find that even in these games conflict
damages coordination, although to a lesser extent than what is reported by Crawford et al.
(2008). Penczynski et al. (2021) split the payoffs of battle of the sexes games, in an attempt to
highlight players’ common interest in coordinating. They find that when the common interest
payoffs are highly salient, coordination improves but the presence of conflict still damages
coordination. Parravano and Poulsen (2015) change the size of the payoffs and thus the
incentives to coordinate. Their results are consistent with Crawford et al. (2008). Finally,
Isoni et al. (2019) investigate whether varying the amount of information that players have
on the payoffs affects coordination. Their experimental manipulation, however, is mostly
ineffective. For a comprehensive review of focal point experiments see Rojo Arjona (2020).
The literature above shows that payoff-related mechanisms have had limited success in
overcoming coordination failure in the presence of conflict. In the spirit of Schelling’s theory
of focal point, our contribution focuses instead on label-based mechanisms consisting of a
salience manipulation of the focal point.
The importance of salience in these games can be better understood by referring back
to the husband and wife’s anecdote. If the consorts have opposing preferences of where to
meet, attention might shift from the focal point to the conflict, leading to doubts as to what
each consort will do: is she(he) going to go to her(his) preferred place? Is she(he) going to
go to my preferred place? These doubts, in the absence of communication, might prevent
the “meeting of minds” that Schelling poses as the basis for coordination. The conflict of
interest reduces the perceived importance of the focal point as a solution to the coordination
problem and at the same time increases that of the payoffs. But because payoffs cannot
offer a unique solution, coordination is less likely to occur. We experimentally investigate
whether increasing the salience of the focal point helps increase its perceived importance.
The intuition is that, in Schelling’s words, increasing the salience of the “obvious place” will
increase its “power of suggestion”, so that the obvious place now “commands [more] attention”
than before.
Our experimental design builds on the pie game by Crawford et al. (2008) as this study is
the first one to provide evidence against Schelling’s theory, and the game lends itself nicely
to salience manipulations. In the pie game, two players are presented with a 3-slice pie with
one slice uniquely coloured. Players, without communicating, simultaneously choose one of
the slices, and coordinate if they choose the same slice. In our experiment, the uniquely
coloured slice is red and we manipulate its salience (obviousness) by increasing the number
of the non-salient slices. To this effect, we employ four types of pies with two, three, seven
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and eleven slices. The greater the number of these slices, the greater the salience of the red
slice.
Like previous studies, we employ: a pure coordination game (PC) as a benchmark to eval-
uate coordination success in other games and the effectiveness of our salience manipulation;
four games with different degrees of conflict of interest between players (A1 − A4); a hi-lo
game (HL), that like pure coordination games does not feature conflict of interest, but unlike
these games one coordinated outcome Pareto-dominates the others; and four games in which
coordinated outcomes vary for the degree of inequality between players’ payoffs (B1−B4).
We implemented these games within subjects and the pie types between subjects.
We find that subjects choose the red slice significantly more often in pies with a large
number slices compared to those with fewer slices. This is the case not only in PC games
but also, as hypothesised, in games with conflict of interest, although the effect of salience
is not as strong as in PC.
In this experiment, the perceived importance of the payoffs might be increased at the
expense of the focal point, by having the same pie type with different payoffs in all tasks.
Evidence from cognitive psychology (e.g. Gibson, 1969; Hall, 2003; Lavis et al., 2011) shows
that the perceived salience of some distinctive features (e.g., A and B) with respect to
a common feature (e.g., X) – and the corresponding behavioural impact – can increase
depending on the sequence in which stimuli (AX and BX) are presented to subjects (human
and animal). For example, Mackintosh et al. (1991) find that rats pay more attention to
the sucrose - A - and the saline - B - element of flavours than to the lemon base (X) when
the compound flavours are presented in an intermixed sequence - AX,BX,AX,BX . . . -
than when they are presented in blocks - AX,AX,BX,BX . . . - i.e. intermixed-blocked
effect. Based on this evidence, we believe that the between-subject design, which relies on a
methodology that is widely used in economic experiments, highlights the importance of the
payoffs. In our experiment, the payoffs are the distinctive features A, B . . . , and the pie
type the common one X. In an attempt to increase even further the salience of the red slice,
we also run a within-subject version of the same experiment, in which both games and pie
types are implemented within-subject.1 For an extensive discussion about the advantages
and disadvantages of within-subject and between-subject designs, see Charness et al. (2012).
The intermixed-blocked effects can be seen as a close relative of behavioural spillovers
reported in the economic literature. In principle, the two effects might in fact refer to the
same behavioural phenomenon, however given that we are not aware of any studies that
1The use of findings from other disciplines, such as cognitive psychology, is not only common but also
fruitful in the study of focal points (see Kuo et al., 2009; Hargreaves-Heap et al., 2017; Sontuoso and Bhatia,
2020; Li and Camerer, 2019)
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compare and contrast the two effects, we are not in a position to say more about how they
relate to each other. What matters here though is that having the pie types implemented
within-subject might give rise to spillovers of salience. There is a growing literature that
studies behavioural spillovers in both cooperation and coordination games (e.g. Bednar et
al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012; Haruvy and Stahl, 2012). Relevant to our study are behaviour
spillovers of a concept or rule learnt in one game and applied to another one. Example of such
spillovers include the concept of Pareto-dominance that is transferred from stag-hunt games
to order statistics games (Cooper and Kagel, 2005) and the transfer of norms of cooperation
from weak-link games to Prisoners’ dilemmas (Knez and Camerer, 2000). In our experiment,
salience as a solution concept might spillover from the 11- and 7-slice pies to pies with fewer
slices. Once the importance of the focal point as a coordination device is recognised in one
context (e.g. 11-slice pie), it can be fruitfully applied to another one (e.g. 2-slice pie).
In the within-subject experiment we find evidence of an even stronger effect of salience
compared to the between-subject experiment. Subjects choose the red slice more frequently
in all pies types and games compared to the between-subject experiment. Furthermore,
we find, in most cases, no differences in the proportion of red slice choices across pie types.
Finally, even in games with conflicts of interest, we report, with few exceptions, little evidence
of coordination failure.
Overall we find strong support for our conjecture. When the salience of the focal points
increases, coordination success increases. When the salience of the focal point is at its lowest
(e.g. the 2-slice pie in the between-subject design), our results mimic the pattern observed
in the literature (e.g. Crawford et al., 2008; Isoni et al., 2013). When the salience of the focal
point is at its highest, our results support Schelling’s theory of focal point. Our findings,
therefore, reconcile both the stylised facts highlighted in previous experiments and Schelling’s
theory of focal points.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 deals with the experimental
design; Section 3 sets out the hypotheses; Section 4 is devoted to the experimental results
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Game Description
Coordination games with payoff-irrelevant cues feature two players, indexed i = {1, 2}; a set
of n pure strategies {s1, ..., sn}, indexed j; and a set of n labels {l1, ..., ln}, with a one-to-one
correspondence between labels and strategies. The set of labels is identical for and known
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by both players. If players choose the same strategy j, their payoffs are given by πij > 0;
otherwise is πij = 0.
2.2 Frame Selection
A typical experimental procedure to induce label salience consists of attaching one label to
each strategy so that one stands out. Crawford et al. (2008), for example, use a coordination
game in which strategies are labelled “X” and “Y ”. Their results show that “X” is more
salient than “Y ”. By contrast, in the 3-slice pie game by the same authors, or in the games
employed by Hargreaves-Heap et al. (2014), salience comes from one label being unique, an
oddity. By definition, oddities require more than two strategies and, as the frequency of
non-unique labels increases, the oddity becomes less frequent and therefore more salient.
(a) 2-slice Pie (b) 3-slice Pie
(c) 7-slice Pie (d) 11-slice Pie
Figure 1: Pies used in the experiment
In our experiment (see Figure 1) we use variations of the pie game. Our pies feature
n ∈ {2, 3, 7, 11} slices with colour as labels. Specifically l1 = {red} and lj = {white} for
j 6= 1. Players’ payoffs are given by π1j = a and π2j = b if j 6= 2 and π1j = c and π2j = d
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if j = 2. When n = 2, l1 is salient by virtue of its colour. As evidenced by research in
psychology, and neuroscience, the colour red possesses some unique features that make it
stand out compared to other colours (see Elliot and Maier, 2014, for a review).2 When n > 2,
l1 becomes more salient as it is an oddity, and as n increases, its frequency ( 1n) decreases
becoming visually more salient. Thus, by increasing the number of slices we vary the salience
of l1.3
We denote the unique Red Slice with coordinated payoffs (a, b) by RS, the slice with
coordinated payoffs (c, d) by PS (Payoff Salient slice), and the remaining White slices with
the same coordinated payoffs (a, b) as RS by W .
2.3 Payoff Configurations
We employ 10 games whose payoff configurations are reported in Table 1. These have been
selected because of their possible interaction with label salience.
Games RS (W) PS(a, b) (c, d)
PC 10, 10 10, 10
HL 10, 10 11, 11
A1 10.1, 10 10, 10.1
A2 11, 10 10, 11
A3 13, 8 8, 13
A4 15, 6 6, 15
B1 12, 9 10, 11
B2 11, 10 9,12
B3 20,10 10,11
B4 18, 12 10, 11
Table 1: Game Payoffs
PC is a pure coordination game (i.e., a = b = c = d) routinely used in the literature as a
benchmark against which behaviour in other games is compared to. HL is a Hi-Lo game with
the slice PS being the Pareto-dominant equilibrium and the slice RS being label-salient but
2This research demonstrates the special features that the colour red has compared to other colours. Red
is visually salient and attracts more attention than other colours (Etchebehere and Fedorovskaya, 2017), it
seems to suggest an object’s importance and it sticks to memory better than other colours (Kuhbandner et
al., 2015). Research on visual systems in humans suggests that the visual salience of an object also relates
to its uniqueness and rarity, other than features such as colour, shape etc. (Jiang et al., 2013).
3Although we cannot exclude that subjects in our experiment could use labels outside the experimenters’
control, we found evidence that this was not the case, as RS was the most prevalent choice.
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Pareto-dominated (i.e., a = b < c = d). This payoff configuration creates a tension between
label salience and payoff dominance.
A1 − A4 are games with a constant degree of conflict in which a > c, d > b, and in
addition a = d and b = c (battle of the sexes type of games). The degree of conflict is
measured by the difference a− b = d− c, that progressively increases from A1 to A4. These
games, similar in structure to some of the games in Crawford et al. (2008) and Isoni et al.
(2013, 2019), are key to test our label salience hypotheses.
The remaining games provide further insights into the interaction between payoffs and
label salience. B1−B2 are games in which the degree of conflict differs across equilibria (i.e.,
a > b and d > c). In B1, the label salient equilibrium produces a more unequal distribution
of payoffs between players than PS, while in B2 the opposite holds. In B3 − B4, the sum
of players’ payoffs in RS is greater than that in PS as is the inequality of payoffs between
players. B3, in addition, features a conflict of interest that is instead absent in B4.
We will indicate the two players as P1 (player 1) and P2 (player 2). P1 has the higher
payoff on the focal point (RS) and W slices when present, and the lower payoff on PS. This
distinction is not meaningful in games PC and HL.
2.4 Implementation
We implemented the pie types in both a between-subject and within-subject experiment
(henceforth BSE and WSE, respectively). Subjects faced 10 payoffs configurations with
each pie type in WSE while in BSE, to keep the number of tasks constant across experi-
ments, they faced the payoff configurations four times with the same pie type. The 10 payoffs
configurations were randomised in both experiments and in the within-subjects also the pie
types.
To avoid creating additional label cues, potentially arising from the relative position of
the slices (see Blume and Gneezy, 2010), pies were randomly rotated across participants and,
for n > 3, RS and PS were kept apart (see Figure 1). Each slice reported the coordinated
payoffs, and to make sure subjects were aware of the consequences of not coordinating,
the dis-coordination payoffs were reported on the top of the screen. Each participant was
randomly paired with another participant in the room in each game. Feedback was only
provided at the end of the experiment and only for a randomly selected task. This task, in
addition to a participation fee of £2, determined the earnings for the whole experiment.
The experimental sessions were run at the University of East Anglia. A total of 98 and
210 participants took part in WSE and BSE respectively.4 They were recruited using the
4In BSE, the number of subjects in the 2-slice pie, 3-slice pie, 7-slice pie and 11-slice pie treatments are
respectively 54, 56, 58 and 42.
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hRoot system (Bock et al., 2014) from the general student population. The experiment was
run on individual computer terminals with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). Upon arrival, subjects
were asked to read the instructions (see Appendix A.1) and to answer a questionnaire to test
their understanding. Average earnings for both experiments, inclusive of the participation
fee, were around (£9.61 in WSE within-subject experiment and £7.89 for BSE).
3 Hypotheses
Level-k models (e.g., Crawford et al., 2008) and the theory of team reasoning (Sugden, 1993,
1995; Bacharach, 2006) are commonly employed to explain behaviour in coordination games
with salient labels.
Level-k assumes that players differ in their level of strategic sophistication. The model
proposed by Crawford et al. (2008) assumes non-strategic Level-0 players (L0s) who choose
the strategy associated with the outcome with the largest own-payoff with a probability
p > 1/2 (i.e., L0s have a “payoff-bias”). Changes in label salience do not affect the behaviour
of level-k players because players react primarily to payoffs and use salience only as a tie-
breaker. Therefore an increase in salience does not affect the model’s predictions.5
Team reasoning assumes that in a coordination problem players look for a rule that, if
followed by both players, maximises the chances of coordination leading to the best possible
outcome for both. If an outcome stands out by virtue of the labels attached to strategies, for
example RS in the pie game, players should choose the corresponding label when no better
rule is available. The theory implicitly assumes that, provided such a rule exists, players
will be able to identify it and act accordingly. However this might not be the case if players
do not recognise the importance of labels in offering a solution to the coordination problem.
The importance of labels, we conjecture, is positively related to how salient they are.
Variable Frame Theory (Bacharach, 1993; Bacharach and Bernasconi, 1997; Bacharach,
2006) offers a mechanism that is closely related to our conjecture. We speak about rule
identification, the theory speaks about attribute or label identification. According to the
theory, some labels are highly available, easily noticeable, and some others are not. Most
players can identify highly available strategies, but fewer are able to identify less available
ones. Label availability increases with salience and determines players’ strategy set (e.g.,
“Choose the red slice”, “Pick a white slice”). In our context, a player who does not perceive
the importance of the red colour in solving the coordination problem will not consider “Choose
5It is debated whether L0s are an empirical reality or only exists in the mind of higher-level players
(Arad and Rubinstein, 2012; van Elten and Penczynski, 2020). The predictions of the model do not depend
on this.
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the red slice” as the best rule.6
While none of these theories can be applied to derive hypotheses in our context without
the introduction of new assumptions, our conjecture, if supported by our results, can inform
future development of such theories.
The predictions in our games can be summarised as follows. For any given game, an
increase in label salience leads to an increase in the proportion of RS choices. The only
exceptions is HL. As the rule that maximises players payoffs (if also chosen by the other
player) is to choose the payoff-dominant slice PS, increasing label salience does not affect
RS choices.
Hypothesis: For any given game, with the exception of HL, an increase in label salience
leads to an increase in the proportion of RS choices.
4 Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports the distribution of RS, PS and pooledW choices (whenW slices are present)
broken down by game and pie type. Proportions for WSE and BSE are displayed in the
top and bottom panel, respectively.
W slices are seldom chosen in both experiments: less than 6% of the times in WSE,
and no more than 10% in BSE (e.g., A2). PS choices are modal only in HL, consistently
with subjects following the payoff-dominant strategy. In all other games, RS is the most
frequently chosen slice. Hence, the subsequent analysis will focus on this slice.
Upon inspection of Figure 2, which reports the proportion of RS choices by game and
pie type, we observe three main patterns in our data.
(a) In BSE, in line with our hypothesis, the proportion of RS choices increases, with few
exceptions, as the number of slices increases.
(b) In almost all games and pie types, RS is chosen more often in WSE than in BSE.
Specifically, in games A1−A4 we report much larger proportions than previous studies.7
6An equally valid alternative to the model of team reasoning is to assume that team identification, in the
spirit of Bacharach we-thinking (Bacharach, 1993, 2006), can be influenced by label salience. The greater
the label salience is, the greater the probability that players we-think and choose accordingly. Charness and
Sontuoso (2019) offer a novel solution concept that allows for the possibility that players may become aware
of new frames, over time.
7Crawford et al. (2008), for example, report for 2× 2 games, comparable in terms of degree of conflict to
A1 and A2, an average proportion of label salient choices (such as RS) of about 53% and 39%, respectively.
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Slice PC HL A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4
#
RS/W (10,10) (10,10) (10.1,10) (11,10) (13,8) (15,6) (12,9) (11,10) (20,10) (18,12)





RS 0.96 0.16 0.85 0.77 0.76 0.66 0.54 0.87 0.75 0.86
PS 0.04 0.84 0.15 0.24 0.25 0.34 0.46 0.13 0.26 0.14
3
RS 0.95 0.18 0.87 0.85 0.78 0.73 0.65 0.83 0.71 0.83
PS 0.03 0.82 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.27 0.33 0.13 0.27 0.14
W 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
7
RS 0.93 0.23 0.83 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.57 0.80 0.73 0.85
PS 0.01 0.76 0.14 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.43 0.17 0.25 0.14
W 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01
11
RS 0.95 0.28 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.82 0.57 0.82 0.72 0.83
PS 0.01 0.72 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.43 0.16 0.29 0.14





RS 0.70 0.04 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.35 0.75 0.72 0.85
PS 0.30 0.96 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.65 0.25 0.29 0.15
3
RS 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.61 0.67 0.59 0.43 0.75 0.59 0.69
PS 0.08 0.81 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.33 0.48 0.17 0.34 0.24
W 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
7
RS 0.92 0.26 0.78 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.53 0.70 0.60 0.65
PS 0.03 0.71 0.15 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.43 0.23 0.35 0.29
W 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07
11
RS 0.92 0.27 0.77 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.51 0.77 0.64 0.72
PS 0.01 0.73 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.46 0.20 0.35 0.26
W 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
Table 2: Distribution of choices over slices by game and pie type in WSE
In addition in WSE, unlike in BSE, we do not observe much variation in RS choices
across pie types.
(c) Finally, in both experiments, and consistently with the literature, RS is chosen less
often in games with a constant degree of conflict than in PC.
The patterns highlighted above are supported by a more formal statistical analysis on
RS choices. We run three sets of logit regressions with clusters at the subject level. For all
regressions we report the marginal effects. In all sets the dependent variable takes value one
if subjects choose RS and zero otherwise.
In WSE, we report instead an average of 85% and 77% in each case. For similar games, in Isoni et al.
(2013), percentages of label salient choices are about 62%, 52% and 54% for degrees of conflict analogous to
A2, A3, and A4 respectively. Comparable results are also found in Sitzia and Zheng (2019).
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Figure 2: Proportion of RS choices by game and pie type
4.2 The effect of salience on RS choices
In the first set of models (see Table 3) we analyse the overall effect of salience on RS
choices including all controls. As independent variables we employ indicator variables for:
the experiments (Experiment WSE, which takes value one for experiment WSE and zero
otherwise); the pie types ( with the 2-slice pie as baseline); the games, with PC as baseline.
Finally, we employ Period to control for experience effects. Model (1) and model (2) include
only the BSE and WSE data, respectively. Model (3) uses both sets of data.
In model (1) the estimated margins of the indicator variables for the number of slices
are positive, in line with both pattern (a) and our main hypothesis. In model (2) increasing
the number of slices does not lead to a significant change on RS choices. In model (3)
the variable Experiment WSE is positive and significant, suggesting an expected stronger






3-slice 0.048 0.019 0.039
(0.042) (0.016) (0.029)
7-slice 0.088** 0.004 0.063**
(0.041) (0.018) (0.029)
11-slice 0.117*** 0.021 0.085***
(0.045) (0.020) (0.030)
HL -0.662*** -0.734*** -0.685***
(0.029) (0.037) (0.023)
A1 -0.142*** -0.101*** -0.129***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.017)
A2 -0.208*** -0.153*** -0.191***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.018)
A3 -0.194*** -0.168*** -0.186***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.018)
A4 -0.222*** -0.196*** -0.214***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.017)
B1 -0.389*** -0.371*** -0.382***
(0.026) (0.040) (0.022)
B2 -0.101*** -0.117*** -0.107***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.018)
B3 -0.211*** -0.222*** -0.214***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.023)
B4 -0.117*** -0.108*** -0.114***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.022)
Period 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004)
# Obs. 8,400 3,920 12,320
Note: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for RS choice. Standard errors
are clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3: Marginal Effects
(b). Finally, in line with pattern (c), the estimated margins for A1 − A4 are negative and
significant. This confirms the negative impact of conflict of interests on RS choices. We will
provide a more detailed analysis on this later on. For the moment, we want to highlight
these two results:
Result 1 In line with our hypothesis, we find that as salience increases, RS is chosen more
often.
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Result 2 This salience effect is maximal in WSE than in BSE.
One alternative explanation consistent with Result 2 is that subjects do not pay attention
to the payoffs and choose RS as a default rule in WSE. However, we can rule this out as in
HL the modal choice is the payoff-dominant slice PS. Thus, we can conclude that subjects,
in choosing RS deliberately, are responding to the experimental monetary incentives.
Games with a constant degree of conflict . The regression analysis presented here
will offer some insights on how the change of salience affects behaviour in games with a
constant degree of conflict. In these games the sum and the difference of players’ payoffs is
the same across slices. As independent variables we employ Experiment WSE, Period, the
number of slices that features in a pie, i.e., # Slices, and the absolute difference in player’s






# Slices 0.019*** 0.003 0.014***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.004)
Payoff Difference -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Period 0.001* 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005)
# Obs. 4,200 1,960 6,160
Note: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for RS choice in games
PC and A1 − A4. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Marginal effects in PC, A1− A4
In line with our hypothesis, the marginal effect of # Slices is positive and strongly
significant in BSE, while it is not in WSE. This lack of significance in WSE indicate that
salience variations across pies do not influence behaviour in this experiment. Furthermore,
we find that the RS slice is chosen significantly more often in WSE than in BSE (see
Experiment WSE in model (3) results). These two results together are compatible with
the intermixed-blocked effect as well as behavioural spillovers. Notice that the difference in
behaviour between the two experiments cannot be explained by experience, as the number of
games in both experiments is the same and we control for time effects including the variable
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Period in all models. Finally, the degree of conflict influences negatively the probability of
choosing RS. The marginal effect of Payoff Difference shows that one unit increase of the
difference in payoffs decreases RS choices by 1.4%.
These results are robust to different model specifications and when we break down the
analysis by player (see Appendix A.2). For example, Figure 3 presents the margins and the
95% confidence intervals of PC and A1− A4 of a model that includes # Slices and Payoff
Difference allowing now for quadratic effects of these two variables, and interactions terms
(# Slices × Payoff Difference). The likelihood of choosing RS decreases when the degree
of conflict increases and increases when the number of slices increases. In addition, we also
observe a higher proportion of RS choice in WSE than in BSE. See Appendix A.2 for
further details.
Result 3 The conflict of interest affects negatively RS choices but this effect is reduced when
salience increases.
Figure 3: Predicted Margins PC and A1− A4
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Other games . So far, we have focused on PC and games with a constant degree of
conflict, as these games allow for a controlled test of how conflict affects RS choices as the
salience of RS increases. Games HL and B1−B4 are useful to explore the effect of a change
on salience on RS choices in the presence of other payoffs considerations. These include:
a payoff dominant equilibrium that does not coincide with the payoff-irrelevant focal point
(HL); different degrees of inequality in players’ payoffs across equilibria (i.e. difference in
players’ payoffs in each coordinated outcome); and different degrees of payoff efficiency (i.e.
the sum of players’ payoff in each coordinated equilibrium) across equilibria. Therefore, we
run a third set of regressions with Experiment WSE, # Slices, indicator variables controlling
for the characteristics of the different games, and Period as independent variables. These






















# Obs. 4,200 1,960 6,160
Note: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for RS choice in games
HL and B1 − B4. Standard errors, in round brackets, are clustered at the
individual level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Marginal effects in HL, B1−B4
The results show that the size of both marginal effects of Experiment WSE and # Slices
are smaller than in games PC, A1−A4. The predicted margin for Experiment WSE is still
strongly significant while it is not for # Slices. This indicates that label salience matters
less in the presence of inequality between players’ payoffs and/or efficiency (see, for example,
Faillo et al., 2017; Galeotti et al., 2019, for the importance of payoff inequality and efficiency
on coordination without labels). These results remain robust when we run the same analysis
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by player (see Appendix A.2).
Result 4 When there are other payoff-considerations such as inequality or efficiency, salience
matters less.
To summarise, our results show that, in line with the literature, an increase in conflict
of interest reduces the power of the focal point but also that, in line with our hypothesis,
an increase in salience leads to an increase in the proportion of RS choices (see results in
Table 4). This increase, maximal in WSE, leads to an unparalleled success of salience in
coordination games with conflicts of interest (see footnote 7).
4.3 Coordination
In this subsection, we analyse how increasing the salience of RS affects coordination rates.
Let us define the expected coordination rate (ECR) as the probability that two randomly













indicate the proportion of P1 and P2 choosing slice j. In PC and
HL, in which the distinction between P1 and P2 is not relevant, we pooled the data and
matched a randomly selected player with all other players’ except for herself. Therefore, the
ECR in expression (1) collapses into the same ECR in Mehta et al. (1994).
Table 6 reports the ECR in WSE (top panel) and BSE (bottom panel) for every game
and pie type. As a benchmark, we also report the expected coordination rates relative to
the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) for the 2-slice pie.
For each game and pie type, to test differences in ECRs between pie types, we gener-
ated 10,000 simulated datasets (with the same number of observations as the experimental
dataset) by repeatedly sampling with replacement from the actual distribution of choices. In
this way we obtain 10,000 ECRs. From the distribution of bootstrapped ECRs, we derive
confidence intervals which allow us to verify whether the observed ECR for the same game
but for a pie with a larger number of slices lies within such interval. If it does, then no sig-
nificant difference is observed. Otherwise, differences in ECR are significant (see Bardsley
et al. (2010); Sitzia and Zheng (2019) for applications of the same test).
The results of these tests, for each experiment, appear at the bottom of the corresponding
panel in Table 6. In WSE, the results show that increasing the number of slices does not,
in general, affect coordination. This should be expected given the lack of variation of RS
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PC HL A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4
RS (W ) (10,10) (10,10) (10.1,10) (11,10) (13,8) (15,6) (12,9) (11,10) (20,10) (18,12)
PS (10,10) (11,11) (10,10.1) (10,11) (8,13) (6,15) (10,11) (9,12) (10,11) (10,11)




2-slice 0.92 0.72 0.74 0.64 0.62 0.54 0.50 0.77 0.62 0.75
3-slice 0.90 0.70 0.77 0.74 0.65 0.58 0.53 0.70 0.58 0.70
7-slice 0.86 0.62 0.69 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.51 0.65 0.58 0.73










2-slice 0.58 0.93 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.62 0.58 0.74
3-slice 0.71 0.68 0.57 0.47 0.50 0.42 0.40 0.60 0.46 0.53
7-slice 0.84 0.57 0.63 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.54 0.46 0.50
11-slice 0.85 0.59 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.46 0.62 0.52 0.57
SL 3>2 *** ### *** ## ### ### ### ###
SL 7>2 *** ### *** *** ### ### ### ###
SL 11>2 *** ### *** *** *** *** ### ## ###
SL 7>3 ** ## * ** ##
SL 11>3 ** # *** * *** ## *
SL 11>7 ** * * *
Note: Significance in line with a positive effect of RS is indicated as follows *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Significance in the opposite direction is indicated as follows
### p<0.01, ## p<0.05, # p<0.1.
Table 6: Expected Coordination rates
choices across pie types. In BSE, coordination rates in most games increase as the number
of slices increases. The only systematic negative effects arise in HL and B1 − B4. In HL
an increase in the salience of RS has a negative impact on coordination in both WSE and
BSE. This is because label salience and payoff dominance suggest different slices. As payoff-
dominance is a successful coordination rule, increasing label salience reduces its effectiveness
as the proportion of RS choices increase. In games B1 − B4 we find similar results. This
suggests that in the presence of payoffs considerations other than conflicts of interest, strong
label salience is not necessarily desirable.
5 Conclusions
Schelling (1960) showed that individuals are capable of successfully coordinate their expec-
tations making use of payoff-irrelevant features of a strategic situation. Recent experimental
evidence, however, has shown that Schelling’s results were too optimistic. An ever so small
conflict of interests between parties is capable of destroying the coordinating effect of focal
points. We have advanced the conjecture that, increasing the salience of the focal point
increases its relevance as a solution concept. This in turn leads to a greater coordination
success not only when the degree of conflict is small but also when it is large. In line with
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Schelling (1960) we find limited evidence of coordination failure when focal points are very
salient, although the negative effect of conflict on coordination is still present. When the
salience of the focal point is low, our results are in line with Crawford et al. (2008) findings.
In this paper we showed that the limitations of focal points in games with conflict,
documented in the literature, are not necessarily at odds with Schelling’s theory of focal
points. It is not enough however for a focal point to be present, it has to be sufficiently
salient to be recognised as a solution.
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The instructions for the within-subjects (experiment 1) and the between-subjects (experi-
ment 2) are identical. The only change is the pie types shown. Instructions here corresponds
to the 3-slice pie treatment in experiment 2.
Experimental Instructions
Welcome to this experiment in decision making.
We kindly ask you not to talk for the entire duration of the experiment. If you have any
question at any time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will go to your desk.
In this experiment, you will be presented with a series of 40 tasks. In each task you will
be matched with another person in the room. You will not be told who this person is. Your
earnings will depend both on your decision and the decision of the other person. You will
receive feedback only at the end of the experiment.
The Task
In each task, you and the other person will be presented with the same pie, like the one
shown below, and asked to choose one slice by clicking on your choice.
In each slice there are two amounts, represented by letters in the pie above. If you and
the other person choose a different slice, you both earn nothing in that task. If instead
you and the other person choose the same slice, you will earn the amount on the left of
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the comma of the chosen slice while the other person will earn the amount on the right. In
the actual experiment the letters will be replaced by numbers.
How do you earn money?
You will receive a show-up fee of £2 pounds. In addition, at the end of the experiment
the computer will randomly select one of the 40 tasks and the payment will be deter-
mined as explained above. Thus, since you do not know which task will be selected at
the end of the experiment and who you are matched with in that task, it is in your
best interest to treat each task independently. In addition, in the actual experiment,
the amounts displayed will vary from task to task. It is therefore in your best interest
to inspect carefully the amounts displayed in every slice of the pie before making a choice.
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A.2 Robustness Checks
BSE P1 BSE P2 WSE P1 WSE P2 All P1 All P2
Experiment WSE 0.141*** 0.136***
(0.036) (0.044)
# Slices 0.014* 0.022*** 0.005 0.002 0.011** 0.016***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Payoff Difference 0.005** -0.016*** -0.003 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Period 0.002** -0.0002 0.003** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# Obs. 1,680 1,680 784 784 2,464 2,464
Note: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for RS choice only in games A1−A4 (as in PC, there
are no asymmetries to distinguish between players). Standard errors clustered at the individual level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A1: Marginal effects in A1− A4 by player
BSE P1 BSE P2 WSE P1 WSE P2 All P1 All P2
Experiment WSE 0.102*** 0.112***
(0.037) (0.040)
# Slices -0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
B2 0.293*** 0.283*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.277*** 0.274***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.047) (0.048) (0.025) (0.025)
B3 0.217*** 0.141*** 0.166*** 0.129*** 0.199*** 0.137***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.047) (0.043) (0.024) (0.023)
B4 0.259*** 0.286*** 0.251*** 0.272*** 0.255*** 0.282***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.048) (0.053) (0.025) (0.026)
Period 0.002** 0.002* 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# Obs. 1,680 1,680 784 784 2,464 2,464
Note: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for RS choice only in games B1 − B4 (as in HL,
there are no asymmetries to distinguish between players). Standard errors clustered at the individual level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A2: Marginal effects in B1−B4 by player
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BSE WSE
# Slices 0.028*** 0.003
(0.008) (0.003)




# Obs. 4,200 1,960
Note: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for RS
choice in games PC, A1 − A4. Standard errors clustered at
the individual level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table A3: Marginal effects in PC, A1− A4
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